Actually, as is often the case, the caveat above is a bit misleading. I've been thinking about Afghanistan, after reading some fragments of blog posts that included a discussion of the issues entitled: "How to get out of Afghanistan." And I immediately thought about South Korea.
Now that our (by "our" I mean US) significant military presence in South Korea is in its 60th year, why does no one take seriously the idea that we need to "get out" of South Korea? Because the mission is viewed as a "success" – we have a long-standing, almost unquestionable partnership with the South Koreans.
So why is the only way to conceptualize "success" in Afghanistan couched in terms of "getting out"? I think a real, genuine geopolitical success could just as easily be conceptualized as getting to the point where conditions "on the ground" for US troops in Afghanistan are just as boring and routine as the conditions for US troops in South Korea.
I'm not saying that's the only option. But I think people who insist that "leaving Afghanistan" is the only possible way to be successful are deeply misunderstanding what the role of "enlightened military superpower" is supposed to be. Not that I agree with the idea that the US must necessarily be an enlightened military superpower – but you can't have it both ways: choosing to operate on those terms in a place like South Korea, because it's convenient and relatively painless, and then failing to operate on those same terms in a place like Afghanistan, because it's painful and inconvenient.
It seems consistency is important not just in parenting and teaching children, but in geopolitics, too.