David Brooks, in the New York Times, writes about "The End of Philosophy." He's talking about new approaches to morality that are less founded in rationality, and more based on what appears to be the concrete evidence of modern neurological research. But he also defends "religion." And attacks "new atheism" — whatever that is. He writes,
Some of this, I agree with. I am not comfortable with the idea that atheism is purely rational. Indeed, I have often, only half-jokingly, referred to myself as a "faith-based atheist." And I'm very skeptical about the "purity" of my reasoning.
But then he uses the phrase "unwarranted faith in the power of pure reason." What, exactly, is "warranted" about other types of faith (as opposed to an atheistic faith)? Isn't the definition of "faith" something akin to "unwarranted belief"? This seems to force the whole argument to collapse in on itself, because instead of successfully defending religion against atheism using evidence from evolutionary psychology, he ends up merely supporting the irrationality of the whole edifice of both philosophy and religion. I doubt that was his intention.